Search Results

In order to enhance customer experience [5] and to reduce time to market, the manufacturers are constantly in need of being able to update software/firmware of the Electronic Control units (ECU) when the vehicle is in field operations. The updates could be a bug fix or a new feature release. Until the recent years, the updation of software/firmware used to be done using a physical hardwired connection to the Vehicle in a workshop. However, with the element of connectivity being added to the vehicle, the updation of software can be done remotely and wirelessly over the air using a feature called Flash over the air (FOTA) [2] and Software over the air (SOTA) [2]. In order to safeguard the telematics [3] ECU from tampering or hacking, the manufacturers are doing away with the ports on the underlying hardware through which manual flashing used to be done. This means that, the only option available to flash or update the ECU is using FOTA/SOTA.

We propose a security-testing framework to analyze attack feasibilities for automotive control software by integrating model-based development with model checking techniques. Many studies have pointed out the vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol, which is widely used in in-vehicle network systems. However, many security attacks on automobiles did not explicitly consider the transmission timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. Additionally, in terms of security testing for automobiles, most existing studies have only focused on the generation of the testing packets to realize vulnerabilities, but they did not consider the timing of invoking a security testing. Therefore, we focus on the transmit timing of CAN packets to realize vulnerabilities. In our experiments, we have demonstrated the classification of feasible attacks at the early development phase by integrating the model checking techniques into a virtualized environment.

Recent developments in the commercialization of mobility services have brought unprecedented connectivity to the automotive sector. While the adoption of connected features provides significant benefits to vehicle owners, adversaries may leverage zero-day attacks to target the expanded attack surface and make unauthorized access to sensitive data. Protecting new generations of automotive controllers against malicious intrusions requires solutions that do not depend on conventional countermeasures, which often fall short when pitted against sophisticated exploitation attempts. In this paper, we describe some of the latent risks in current automotive systems along with a well-engineered multi-layer defense strategy. Further, we introduce a novel and comprehensive attack and performance test framework which considers state-of-the-art memory corruption attacks, countermeasures and evaluation methods.

Cyber security is becoming increasingly critical in the car industry. Not only the entry points to the external world in the car need to be protected against potential attack, but also the on-board communication in the car require to be protected against attackers who may try to send unauthorized CAN messages. However, the current CAN network was not designed with security in mind. As a result, the extra measures have to be taken to address the key security properties of the secure CAN communication, including data integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and freshness. While integrity and authenticity can be achieved by using a relatively straightforward algorithms such as CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) and Confidentiality can be handled by a symmetric encryption algorithm like AES128 (128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard), it has been recognized to be more challenging to achieve the freshness of CAN message.

CAN bus network proved to be efficient and dynamic for small compact cars as well as heavy-duty vehicles (HDV). However, HDVs are more susceptible to malicious attacks due to lack of security in their intra-vehicle communication protocols. SAE proposed a new standard named J1939-91C for CAN-FD networks which provides methods for establishing trust and securing mutual messages with optional encryption. J1939-91C ensures message authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality by implementing complex cryptographic operations including hash functions and random key generation. In this paper, the three main phases of J1939-91C, i.e., Network Formation, Rekeying, and Message Exchange, are simulated and tested on Electronic Control Units (ECUs) supporting CAN-FD network. Numerous test vectors were generated and validated to support SAE J1939-91C. The mentioned vectors were produced by simulating different encryption and hashing algorithms with variable message and key lengths.

With the development of vehicle intelligence and the Internet of Vehicles, how to protect the safety of the vehicle network system has become a focus issue that needs to be solved urgently. The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus is currently a very widely used vehicle-mounted bus, and its security largely determines the degree of vehicle-mounted information security. The CAN bus lacks adequate protection mechanisms and is vulnerable to external attacks such as replay attacks, modifying attacks, and so on. On the basis of the existing work, this paper proposes an authentication method that combines Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-SHA256 and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) algorithms. This method is based on dynamic identity authentication in challenge/response made and combined with the characteristics of the CAN bus itself as it achieves the identity authentication between the gateway and multiple electronic control units (ECUs).

Vehicles have more connectivity options now-a-days and these increasing connection options are giving more chances for an intruder to exploit the system. So, the vehicle manufacturers need to make the ECU in the vehicle more secure. To make the system secure, the embedded system must secure all the assets in the system. Examples of assets are Software, Kernel or Operating system, cryptographic Keys, Passwords, user data, etc. In this, securing the Kernel is extremely important as an intruder can even exploit the operating system characteristics just by changing the kernel code without introducing a trojan in the system. Also, the Kernel is the one entity that manages all permissions, so, if the kernel is hacked, these permissions also get compromised. The proposed approach is to make the kernel secure by doing the integrity check periodically of the kernel code loaded into the main memory of the system.

The new generation vehicles these days are managed by networked controllers. A large portion of the networks is planned with more security which has recently roused researchers to exhibit various attacks against the system. This paper talks about the liabilities of the Controller Area Network (CAN) inside In-vehicle communication protocol and a few potentials that could take due advantage of it. Moreover, this paper presents a few security measures proposed in the present examination status to defeat the attacks. In any case, the fundamental objective of this paper is to feature a comprehensive methodology known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which has been a significant device in getting network data in systems over many years. To the best of our insight, there is no recorded writing on a through outline of IDS execution explicitly in the CAN transport network system.

In agriculture industry, increasing use of Vehicle Internet of Things (IoT), telematics and emerging technologies are resulting in smarter machines with connected solutions. Inter and Intra Communication with vehicle to vehicle and inside vehicle - Electronic Control Unit (ECU) to ECU or ECU (Electronic Control Unit) to sensor, requirement for flow of data increased in-turn resulting in increased need for secure communication. In this paper, we focus on functional verification and validation of secure Controller Area Network (CAN) for intra vehicular communication to establish confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and freshness of data, supporting safety, advanced automation, protection of sensitive data and IP (Intellectual Property) protection. Network security algorithms and software security processes are the layers supporting to achieve our cause.

Upon their arrival, Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) brought with them many benefits for those involved in a military campaign. They can use such systems to reconnoiter dangerous areas, provide 24-hr aerial security surveillance for force protection purposes or even attack enemy targets all the while avoiding friendly human losses in the process. Unfortunately, these platforms also carry the inherent risk of being built on innately vulnerable cybernetic systems. From software which can be tampered with to either steal data, damage or even outright steal the aircraft, to the data networks used for communications which can be jammed or even eavesdropped on to gain access to sensible information. All this has the potential to turn the benefits of UAS into liabilities and although the last decade has seen great advances in the development of protection and countermeasures against the described threats and beyond the risk still endures.

Autonomous driving represents the ultimate goal of future automobile development. As a collaborative application that integrates vehicles, road infrastructure, network and cloud, autonomous driving business requires a high-degree dynamic cooperation among multiple resources such as data, computing and communications that are distributed throughout the system. In order to meet the anticipated high demand for resources and performance requirements of autonomous driving, and to ensure the safety and comfort of the vehicle users and pedestrians, a top concern of autonomous driving is to understand the system requirements for resources and conduct an in-depth analysis of the autonomous driving business. In this context, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the typical business for autonomous driving and establishes an analysis model for five common capabilities, i.e. collection, transmission, intelligent computing, human-machine interaction (HMI), and security.

Cyber assurance of heavy trucks is a major concern with new designs as well as with supporting legacy systems. Many cyber security experts and analysts are used to working with traditional information technology (IT) networks and are familiar with a set of technologies that may not be directly useful in the commercial vehicle sector. To help connect security researchers to heavy trucks, a remotely accessible testbed has been prototyped for experimentation with security methodologies and techniques to evaluate and improve on existing technologies, as well as developing domain-specific technologies. The testbed relies on embedded Linux-based node controllers that can simulate the sensor inputs to various heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). The node controller also monitors and affects the flow of network information between the ECUs and the vehicle communications backbone.

Automotive system functionalities spread over a wide range of sub-domains ranging from non-driving related components to complex autonomous driving related components. The requirements to design and develop these components span across software, hardware, firmware, etc. elements. The successful development of these components to achieve the needs from the stockholders requires accurate understanding and traceability of the requirements of these component systems. The high-level customer requirements transformation into low level granularity requires an efficient requirement engineer. The manual understanding of the customer requirements from the requirement documents are influenced by the context and the knowledge gap of the requirement engineer in understanding and transforming the requirements.